The AND gate of the top event shows that both lines has to fail (line 1 has to fail and line 2 has to fail) in order that the system fails. Gate G3 represents failures of automatic actions of pump B3 and valve B4 in order to provide water to point B. Gate G4 represents failures of automatic actions of pump B5 and valve B6 in order to provide water to point B. They are identified by name code and they include description of the failure mode and identification of the component under investigation. Basic event B3 represents failure of pump B3 to start and run for specified period of time at specified capacity. Basic event B4 represents failure of valve B4 to open and stay open for the specified period of time. Basic event B1 represents failure of operator to establish water flow if automatic action was not successful. Similarly is with basic events B2, B5 and B6 on the other line. The fault tree is mathematically represented by a set of Boolean equations or by the fault tree figure itself. The Boolean equations and the fault tree for the example system are presented on Fig. 1 .
Numbers below the basic events represent their failure probabilities, which are either obtained from data bases or they are calculated with the probabilistic models based on data about the previous experience with those or similar components and their failure modes that are defined in the respective basic events.
The qualitative fault tree analysis is the process of Boolean reduction of a set of Boolean equations. The rules of Boolean algebra are presented on Table 1 . The sign for product suits the AND logic and the sign for sum suits the OR logic.
Boolean Law Expressions
Commutative Law X+Y=Y+X XY=YX For the fault tree example from Fig. 1 it is needed that all five logical equations are inserted one to another in order to have one logical equation starting from top event and consisting of basic events as its parameters.
Qualitative fault tree analysis identifies the minimal cut sets, which are the combinations of the smallest number of component faults that may cause the system fault. In other words, the minimal cut sets are combinations of the smallest number of basic events, which, if occur simultaneously, may lead to the top event.
The logical equation representing the fault tree has to be written as the sum of products. The rules of the Boolean algebra are used for rewriting of the equation. For example fault tree from Fig. 1 , eq. 2 represents such required reformulation of eq. 1. SS1 = B3*B1* B5*B2+B4*B1*B5*B2+ B3*B1*B6*B2+ B4*B1* B6*B2
The general expression for the minimal cut sets is the following. m -number of basic events in minimal cut set i. For the example fault tree from Fig. 1 , the qualitative results indicate four minimal cut sets. Each includes four basic events. This means that the safety system 1 fails if basic events B3 and B1 and B5 andB2 occur or if basic events B4 and B1 and B5 and B2 occur or if basic events B3 and B1 and B6 and B2 occur or if basic events B4 and B1 and B6 and B2 occur. Minimal cut set can be a single minimal cut set, if one basic event occurrence causes the top event, or in other words: one component failure causes the system failure. Minimal cut set can be a double minimal cut set, if two basic events occurrences cause the top event, or in other words: two component failures cause the system to fail. Minimal cut set can be a triple minimal cut set, if three basic events occurrences cause the top event. The example fault tree evaluation shows that four quadruple minimal cut sets are qualitative result of fault tree evaluation of the example fault tree. Quantitative fault tree analysis includes the following results. -Calculation of the system unavailability, which is one of the main risk measures at the system and component level, which is based on probability of failure of safety system components and which is obtained through calculation of the top event probability. -Calculation of Risk Increase Factor (RIF, sometimes interpreted also as Risk Achievement Worth, RAW), which identifies components, which in case of their failure (failure probability assumed as 1), impact significantly the system (or plant) risk increase. For those components it is worth to maintain them well in order that the reliability of the system is not reduced (i.e. in order that the risk is not increased). -Calculation of Risk Decrease Factor (RDF, sometimes interpreted also as Risk Reduction Worth, RRW), which identifies components, which in case of their complete success (failure probability is assumed as 0) impact significantly the system (or plant) risk decrease. For those components it is worth to improve their reliability in order that the reliability of the system is increased (i.e. in order that the risk is decreased). The fault tree top event probability is calculated according to eq. 5.
Q SS -top event probability Or, it can be approximated with the following equation -for Q mcsi less than 0.1, the approximate results stay in 10% of accuracy in the conservative side (Čepin, 2005) . If the negated events are considered in the fault tree analysis, the care should be taken about the use of approximations. For the assumption that the basic events are mutually exclusive, the following can be used.
Q Bj -probability of occurrence of basic event B j
Q Bj -probability of occurrence of basic event B j  j -operating failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event B j ,  oj -standby failure rate of the equipment modeled in the basic event B j , q j -probability of failure per demand of equipment modeled in basic event B j , T m -mission time, T ij -test interval of standby equipment modeled in basic event B j , T tj -test duration time of standby equipment modeled in basic event B j , T rj -repair time (i.e. mean time to repair or mean time to restore) of standby equipment modeled in basic event B j , T pj -test placement time of standby equipment modeled in basic event B j (it specifies the timing of test). Probability of occurrence of basic event is calculated according to selected equation. Simple example of probabilistic model for a component, which should actuate on a demand is shown on the following equation. q=n s /n (9) q -probability of failure per demand, n s -number of failed operations, n -number of all operations.
Other probabilistic models are in more details presented in references (NUREG-0492, 1981; Vesely et al., 2002) . Risk Increase Factor is calculated according to the following equation (NUREG/CR-3385, 1983; NEI 00-04, 2005) .
RIF j … Risk Increase Factor for equipment modeled in basic event B j , Q SS (Q Bj ) -top event probability, Q SS (Q Bj =1) -top event probability considering Q Bj =1 (component B j certainly fails). Risk Decrease Factor is calculated according to the following equation.
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Q SS (Q Bj =0) -top event probability considering Q Bj =0 (component B j cannot fail).
Event Tree Analysis
The event tree analysis is a method used to represent potential accident sequences or scenarios associated with a particular undesired initiating event (Papazoglou, 1998; Swaminathan & Smidts, 1999; PRA NASA Guide, 2002) . The initiating event is an event, which may lead to the accident consequences. The event tree model describes the logical interrelationships between potential safety system function successes and failures in a timely manner after the initiating event. Safety system functions are the means to prevent the accident or to mitigate its consequences. Human actions can also be considered similarly as the safety system functions. Each separate safety system function can be further analysed with the fault tree analysis. The end states of the accident scenarios are plant damage states. Fig. 2 shows a generalised example of the event tree. Initiating event can be event such loss of offsite power or important pipe break of specified size for example if nuclear power plant is the object of investigation. 
Fig. 2. Event tree -generalised example
After the initiating event, the safety system 1 should operate in sense that undesired plant damage states are reached. If the system succeeds the scenario goes upwards the event tree, if it fails, downwards at the node of safety system 1. For all safety systems consecutively one after another as their operation follows the time and listing sequence, their success is shown in the event tree upwards from the previous node and failure is shown downwards from the node. The branches of the event tree which refer to safety system failure can be linked to a fault tree model of that safety system. At the end, the plant damage states are identified. Code OK on the Fig. 2 means that the state of the plant is without the damage. The codes CD1, CD2 and CD3 are the codes for plant damage states. Universal plant damage state can be defined as core damage in the case of nuclear power plants. The qualitative results of the event tree analysis include minimal cut sets for accident sequences. Accident sequence is a set of events, which result in a particular plant damage state. Example for the event tree on Fig. 2 is plant damage state 2, which ends with the CD1 plant damage state and includes initiating event, success of safety system 1, success of safety www.intechopen.com Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Risk-Informed Decision-Making 131 system 2 and failure of safety system 3. If the fault trees for safety systems failures are linked to the event tree, the qualitative results of the event tree are similar as to results of the joined fault trees with the difference of presence of initiating event.
The quantitative results include accident sequences frequencies. Each accident sequence frequency is simplified as a product of initiating event frequency and safety system failure or success probabilities. If the event tree is linked with the fault trees for safety systems the initiating event frequency is multiplied with the results of the respected fault trees.
Fault Tree and Event Tree Integration
For the analysis of a nuclear power plant, several event trees are developed and each is linked with many fault trees. The results are then combined together through all respective scenarios and through all the event trees developed for the plant level analysis. Fig. 3 shows the fault tree and event tree integration. Probabilistic safety assessment includes tenths of event trees and hundredths of fault trees linking together thousands of gates and thousands of basic events. If the plant damage state is core damage, the core damage frequency is the respective risk measure for the analysis at the plant level. Analyses up to the state of the reactor core are the subject of level 1 of the probabilistic safety assessment. If the containment and its safety systems are considered in addition, the damage state can be radioactive releases to the environment. Analyses up to the state of the radioactive releases are the subject of level 2 of the probabilistic safety assessment. The large early release frequency is the respective risk measure for level 2. Both risk measures: core damage frequency and large early release frequency are the indicators of the plant safety although the qualitative aspects of the results, which are the most important sets of component failures, which can lead to accident sequences, should not be forgotten. They have been the primary objective of the first probabilistic safety assessments. The described procedures help to confront with risk analyses, which objectives are written in answers to three questions. 1. What can go wrong? Accident scenarios of the event trees give the answer. They can be at the level of the event tree or the can be at the level of linking with the fault trees, where each accident sequence is further represented by minimal cut sets. How likely is it? The probabilities of failures of safety systems and the frequencies of initiating events together give the quantitative results and rank more likely and less likely accident sequences. What are the consequences? Consequences are defined at the end states of the event trees and can be at the level of the state of the core for the level 1 of the probabilistic safety assessment, or they can be at the level of the state of the radioactive releases for the level 2 of the probabilistic safety assessment or they can be at the level 3 of the probabilistic safety assessment, which is oriented to the assessment to the dispersion of radioactive substances in the environment, where the weather conditions play the most important role. 
Fig. 3. Fault tree and event tree integration
The analyses show in general, that the risk of nuclear power plants is small compared to other risks to which we are exposed. Probabilistic safety assessments provide a technique for assessing the safety of a particular facility and also an information base that is applicable to a wide variety of issues and decisions. Probabilistic safety assessment is far wider than only the presented fault tree and event tree integration. The probabilistic safety assessment includes the following main topics. Information collection include collection of large amount of information including systems design descriptions with drawings, operating procedures, technical specifications, manufacturer requirements and recommendations for the testing and maintenance, other studies about the plant and standards about the equipment. Analysis of human reliability and analysis of plant procedures includes the behaviour of operators during testing and maintenance and during routine operations and the diagnosis and actions of the operator teams after the occurrence of undesired initiating events. Data-base development includes collection, classification and evaluation of generic reliability data when the specific data is not yet available and collection, classification and evaluation of plant specific data as a support for quantitative risk analyses. Accident sequence quantification and systems quantification includes application of powerful computer codes for probabilistic safety assessment. Consideration of truncation or cut off is an important issue. Namely, the models are so large that it is not possible analytically solve the models. Approximations are made and negligible contributions are neglected (Čepin, 2005) .
External event analysis includes consideration of earthquakes, fires, floods and other applicable external events for which it is necessary evaluate the plant response. Uncertainty analysis is important as many of probabilistic models include parameters, for which is difficult to get accurate data. Approximations are done and uncertain models are used, which propagate to the results. The risk-informed decision-making has to consider the uncertainties of the evaluations. Analysis of physical processes in materials exposed to high temperatures and pressures in normal and accident conditions is a difficult issue, which has to be performed. Many of those analyses are highly uncertain due to very demanding mathematical models of unknown processes. Analysis of radionuclide release and transport in the environment is largely connected with weather conditions, which may impact the spread of the radionuclide materials in the environment. Special section of the probabilistic safety assessment is its application for other modes than the full plant power operation, e.g. plant shutdown (Kiper, 2002; NUREG/CR-6144, 1995; NUREG-1449 NUREG- , 1992 IAEA-TECDOC-1144 , 2000 . Conduction of the analysis is focused to several time windows. One after another, each time window and each configuration is considered and in each time window the risks are assessed. The configuration with reactor head open for the refuelling is the most important configuration in terms of shutdown risk in nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors.
Risk Criteria
The risk criterion is a term, which distinguishes between what is considered as an acceptable level of safety and what it is not (Čepin, 2007b) . The national approaches about risk criteria differ notably from country to country, so no commonly accepted international agreement exists (NKS-44, 2001; GS-1.14, 2002; Berg et al., 2003) . Quantitative risk objectives in United States of America consider individual and societal risk: -The mean risk of an individual near a nuclear power plant (living within 1 mile radius) to receive an acutely lethal dose through a reactor accident is not to exceed 5E-7/year (this corresponds roughly to 0,1% of the risk from all fatal accidents). -The risk for the general population within ten-mile-radius around a nuclear power plant to die of cancer as a result of the reactor operation should not exceed 2E-6/year (this corresponds to about 0,1% of the total cancer risk conditional on industrial activities). In spite of the fact that no common criteria exist internationally, one can conclude that the production of electrical energy from nuclear power should not contribute notably to the overall risk is common to the national approaches. The ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle is mostly acceptable, which states that the risk should be as low as it is reasonably achievable. In addition, a common position exists that the future power plants should be better and safer than the current ones, which is the position of International Atomic Energy Agency. Namely, the existing and future plants are distinguished in sense that the criteria are stricter in case of future plants for an order of magnitude. The objective for core damage frequency for existing plants is 1E-4/reactor-year and for future plants it is 1E-5/ reactor-year.
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The objective for large early release frequency for existing plants is 1E-5/ reactor-year and for future plants it is 1E-6/ reactor-year.
Risk-Informed Decision-Making
In addition to the risk criteria for the nuclear power plant operation, the risk criteria in some countries are developed in two aspects considering the acceptability of changes.
-The first aspect includes permanent changes; e.g. assessment of acceptability of plant modifications.
-The second aspect includes temporary changes; e.g. consideration about the on-line maintenance. Plant modification is a permanent change in the plant, which may be a physical change (e.g. an upgrade of a system, an addition of redundant equipment, a replacement of some components) or a non-physical change (e.g. improved plant operating procedure or improved testing and maintenance procedure, a change connected with certain requirement). An assessment of acceptability of plant modifications requires the risk criteria for permanent changes in the plant, because modification is a permanent change and it represents a potential for permanent change in risk. On-line maintenance is a wide process of planning, analysing, preparation and implementation of the testing and maintenance of the plant equipment (mostly equipment, which is in stand-by), when the plant is operating, instead of performing those activities in the outage period, when the plant is shut down for refuelling. Consideration about on-line maintenance requires the risk criteria for temporary changes in the plant, because each activity of the on-line maintenance represents a temporary change and it represents a potential for temporary change in risk. In addition, consideration about on-line maintenance may require the risk criteria for permanent changes in the plant, because the approval of the overall concept of the on-line maintenance represents a potential for permanent change in risk. The risk-informed decision-making is a term describing the process of assessing risks connected with technical decisions and considering of the risk results together with other means or with safety analyses to reach the most appropriate decisions. The main and the most general rule is that the activities, which results in decrease of risk, are appreciated and mostly approved. Further, the activities, for which a small increase of risk is evaluated, can be considered acceptable, if the risk increase is small and if there are benefits of the change, which overrule the increase of risk, or if there are no methods and tools to evaluate completely the proposed change in terms of positive and negative aspects in terms of risk. Namely, sometimes it is difficult to evaluate quantitatively all the positive and negative aspects of proposed change in such extent that risk models qualitatively and quantitatively include all the positive and negative aspects of the proposed change. Finally, if a large increase of risk is connected with proposed change, such change is not acceptable. The risk of testing and maintenance of standby safety equipment with consideration of single configuration change can be represented by the core damage frequency or by the large early release frequency. Fig. 4 shows the increased risk as a result of outage of standby equipment i where the core damage frequency is the selected risk measure. The nominal risk is increased in an amount due to inoperable standby safety equipment at the time duration of testing and maintenance of equipment i. The increased risk (Risk i ) should be lower than the acceptance criteria, e.g. Risk criteria =1E-6 (PSA Applications Guide, 1995; Čepin, 2007b) , as it is in equation 15 below.
where:
CDF n -increase of core damage frequency due to outage of equipment i, CDF n -core damage frequency for the nominal conditions of the plant, CDF i1 -core damage frequency with equipment i unavailable due to testing or maintenance, d i … time duration of testing or maintenance of equipment i. If testing and maintenance is performed more frequently than yearly, the frequency of tests is considered in addition.
f i -frequency of testing and maintenance activities, T -time interval considered (e.g. 1 year).
Risk criteria -limit of risk criteria. The criteria may be different for one temporary change and for a cumulative impact of more temporary changes over certain time interval (Čepin, 2007b) . Examples of testing of standby safety equipment are diesel generators in a nuclear power plant. Diesel generators in a nuclear power plant are standby equipment, which should operate in the case if other sources of power system are lost. In such case, they provide power to the safety systems in order to cool the reactor, even if the reactor is in shutdown. Table 2 shows the results of the risk evaluation, if the diesel generator 1 would be the candidate for the on-line maintenance in a nuclear plant.
The results include the core damage frequency of specific plant, its sensitivity to a specific change and the calculated increase of risk considering the risk increase due to inoperable equipment and the time duration of this inoperability. The first column from the left identifies the status and the equipment, which may be subjected to the on-line-maintenance, which is diesel generator 1. The second column gives the core damage frequency for nominal conditions of the plant, which is the same for all online-maintenance activities of the same plant. The third column gives the allowed outage time, which is determined in technical specifications of the plant for the respective equipment and it is the longest possible time duration of testing and maintenance without shutting the plant down. The fourth column gives the core damage frequency with diesel generator 1 unavailable due to testing or maintenance. The fifth column gives the difference between the fourth and the second column, which represents the increase of core damage frequency with diesel generator 1 unavailable due to testing or maintenance. The sixth column gives the risk of on-line-maintenance for diesel generator 1, which is unavailable due to testing or maintenance. The risk is obtained by multiplying the increased core damage frequency with its duration, which is considered as the largest possible time duration, i.e. as the complete allowed outage time. The real risk is normally lower because the testing or maintenance is performed quicker than the complete allowed outage time. The seventh column gives the identification of the analyzed plant. 
Analyses, Results and Applications
Applications of probabilistic safety assessment differ at the utility and at the regulatory body. Regulatory applications of probabilistic safety assessment include monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of rules and requirements, training of the regulatory body staff, risk follow-up, risk-based safety indicators, analysis of operational events, assessment of deviations, response to emergency conditions, ranking of safety issues, ranking of importance of plant equipment, risk-informed inspection, safety guidance and prioritisation of regulatory research. Utility applications of probabilistic safety assessment include: -optimizations of technical specifications, including surveillance requirements optimization, changes and exemptions to technical specifications (Yang et al., 2000; Čepin & Martorell, 2002) , -support for modification of licensing basis and assessment of plant changes, -management of in-service inspection and testing, optimization of maintenance, which includes preventive and corrective maintenance (Martorell et al., 2000; Čepin, 2002) , -configuration control and planning of maintenance at outages, prioritization of activities and scheduling of the activities (Harunuzzaman & Aldemir, 1996) , -improving training for operators and operational support stuff (Čepin, 2007a; Čepin, 2008) , -improving of plant procedures (Prošek & Čepin, 2008) , -improving plant vulnerability and security questions (Čepin et al., 2006; Čepin, 2009 ). In addition, probabilistic safety assessment is used for the design of new plants and it represents a chapter of the final safety report.
Conclusion
Probabilistic safety assessment is a standardized tool for assessing and improving nuclear power plant safety. Its primary methods are the fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. The fault tree analysis is oriented to analyses of systems, while the event tree analysis is oriented to connections between the systems. Qualitative fault tree analysis identifies the combinations of component faults that may cause the system fault. Quantitative fault tree analysis includes calculation of the system unavailability, calculation of risk increase factor, which identifies components, for which it is worth to maintain them well in order that the risk is not increased, calculation of risk decrease factor, which identifies components, for which it is worth to increase the redundancy or to improve their reliability in order that the risk is decreased. The results of the event tree analysis include accident sequences and their frequencies. The core damage frequency and the large early release frequency are among the most common risk measures in probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants. Quantitative risk objectives vary from country to country. The common principle says that the production of electrical energy from nuclear power should not contribute notably to the overall risk. The risk criteria are stricter in case of future plants compared to existing plants. The risk-informed decision-making evaluates risks connected with technical decisions and helps to reach the most appropriate decisions. The applications of the risk-informed decision-making include evaluations of temporary changes such as on-line maintenance and permanent changes such as procedural changes or plant modifications in a nuclear power plant.
